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The European Policy Unit
The European Policy Unit at the European University Institute was created 
to further three main goals. First, to continue the development of the 
European University Institute as a forum for critical discussion of key items 
on the Community agenda. Second, to enhance the documentation available 
to scholars of European affairs. Third, to sponsor individual research 
projects on topics of current interest to the European Communities. Both 
as in-depth background studies and as policy analyses in their own right, 





















































































































































































Political Aspects of European Monetary Integration*
HORST U NG ER ER**
1.
From the beginning, European economic cooperation and monetary 
integration after World War II were politically motivated: to eliminate 
for the future the risk of war between European countries -  which twice 
in this century spread to the whole world -  by tying them together in an 
institutional framework of cooperation and by rebuilding their econo­
mies to avoid large-scale social misery, the breeding ground for extreme 
nationalism and mutual antagonism. As time went on and as the cold 
war started to unfold, another important reason was to strengthen 
resistance to communism in Western Europe. Yet, the history of Euro­
pean economic cooperation and monetary integration is most frequently 
described and analyzed in strictly economic terms. This is understand­
able because the liberalization of trade and the abolition of custom 
tariffs, the elimination of payment restrictions and the granting of credit 
lines can more easily be described and their effects be measured in 
quantitative terms. Improved political cooperation and stability and the 
overcoming of political rivalry eludes precise analysis.
The efforts after World War II to rebuild the shattered economies of 
European countries concentrated on the one hand on constructing a 
world-wide economic order by the establishment of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT), as a stand-in for the never realized International Trade 
Organization, and the International Bank for Reconstruction and
*
Based on a Lecture at the European University Institute, Florence, November 3, 
1992.
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Development (the World Bank) which initially was mainly intended to  
assist in the rebuilding of the European economies. On the other hand, 
the US-financed European Recovery Program (ERP), the Marshall 
Plan, was to give a strong initial boost to countries in Western Europe, 
thus providing a basis for the liberalization of trade and the multilat­
eralization of payments within Europe in the framework of the Organi­
zation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC; established 1947) 
and the European Payments Union (EPU; established 1950). The 
policies pursued through these institutions were successful beyond 
reasonable expectations, and it can be stated with confidence that 
without their success, one could not have seriously thought of creating 
the European Economic Community (EEC).1
The OEEC also promoted greatly political cooperation among its 
member countries and strengthened the feeling of mutual political 
interdependence. That the creation of OEEC and EPU was in large 
part motivated by the political objective of fostering cooperation among 
former enemies in rebuilding their economies was exemplified by the 
inclusion of the western parts of Germany in the work of the ERP and 
the OEEC even before the foundation of the Federal Republic of 
Germany in 1949 -  a striking contrast to the policies of the victorious 
countries after World War I. At the same time, the refusal of the Soviet 
Union (and its satellites in Eastern Europe) to participate in the ERP 
and to join the OEEC was foreshadowing the cold war, and also barred 
East Germany, the future German Democratic Republic, from the un­
folding effort to overcome the consequences of the war. This develop­
ment greatly contributed to the disparate evolution of the economies 
and societies in the two parts of Germany, a fact which came to the 
open with the difficulties associated with German unification in 1990.
2.
The foundation of the European Communities was even more than the 
OEEC a political undertaking, moving in the economic field from 
cooperation to integration and reaching in its ultimate objectives beyond 
the economic sphere. In aiming at integration for the heart of Europe 
-  the six countries which in Western Europe were most deeply affected 
by the war -, the aim was to make war between those countries impos­
sible and to reconcile the “arch enemies” Germany and France. It was 
therefore no accident that the first objective of integration was coal and 
steel, the availability of which was at that time the precondition for the 




























































































nations in Western Europe. For Germany, European integration pro­
mised to liberate the country of the legacy of World War II and of its 
fateful central position in Europe where for centuries it was tom 
between east and west, between alliances and cooperation on the one 
hand, and isolation and confrontation on the other hand.
Even if in its main part -  the EEC -  , the European Community did 
not commit itself to much more than the establishment of a customs 
union, the ultimately political objective of European integration was 
clearly in the mind of such people as Jean Monnet, Robert Schuman, 
Konrad Adenauer, Alcide de Gasperi and statesmen in Belgium, 
Luxembourg and the Netherlands.
It was seen less in this way in the United Kingdom. This was one 
reason why in 1957 -  after agreement on the creation of the EEC had 
been reached -  the UK proposed a large European free trade area, 
which would have encompassed and thus absorbed the EEC.
What matters in this context are not the technical differences 
between a free trade area and a customs union but the difference 
between purely economic objectives and objectives which ultimately 
were political.
3.
The EEC Treaty envisaged in essence only a customs union, to be 
supplemented by a common trade policy and a common agricultural 
policy (CAP). In the treaty, not much is said about cooperation in the 
field of economic and monetary policies. Art.103 to 109 evoke some 
general principles, call for the coordination of economic and monetary 
policies and provide for mutual assistance in case of balance of 
payments problems of member states. Even the liberalization of capital 
movements is required only “to the extent necessary to ensure the 
proper functioning of the common market” (Art.67).
But if we look deeper, we discover political dimensions and ambitions. 
The EC Treaties set up a political institutional structure: in addition to 
the executive Commissions (in the case of the Community for Steel and 
Coal (ECSC), the High Authority; later on, all three bodies were 
merged into one Commission) and the representation of the member 
states, the Council of Ministers, there are the European Parliament and 
the European Court of Justice.
The preamble to the ECSC Treaty refers to safeguarding world 
peace; substituting for age-old rivalries the merging of their essential 




























































































among peoples long divided by bloody conflicts”. The preamble to the 
EEC Treaty emphasizes the determination “to lay the foundations of an 
ever closer union among the peoples of Europe” and the pooling of 
their resources “to preserve and strengthen peace and liberty”.
There are a number of reasons why the EEC Treaty did not go much 
beyond establishing a customs union and does not provide for a close, 
leave alone binding cooperation in economic and monetary policies:
-  the realization that such a binding cooperation and, even more, the 
establishment of an economic and monetary union (EMU) would 
deeply affect national sovereignty;
-  the European countries were aiming at (and achieved in 1958) the 
convertibility of their currencies in the framework of the EPU, an 
important step in monetary integration;
-  the existence of a world-wide monetary system under the auspices of 
the IMF that did not require detailed provisions for the coordination 
of monetary and exchange rate policies: the Bretton Woods system 
was functioning and the US dollar met its responsibilities as the key 
currency of the international monetary system; there was the belief 
that fixed exchange rates would prevail and would only need to be 
safeguarded by escape clauses and provisions for mutual assistance in 
case of emergency (Art.73, 108 and 109 EEC Treaty).
In the Sixties, the situation in the EC was mainly characterized by the 
energy consuming tasks of completing the customs union and imple­
menting the CAP. This had also an important political background: 
President de Gaulle was hostile toward a truly supranational EC. He 
wanted to preserve the traditional nation states and safeguard their 
vitality, and therefore aimed at a “Europe of nations”, with emphasis 
on national sovereignty.
Yet, it was Charles de Gaulle who -  together with Konrad Adenauer
-  brought about the reconciliation of France and Germany which was 
and has remained the linchpin of European integration. In this, he 
showed vision and proved to be a great statesman.
4.
At the end of the Sixties, the EC was marked by two events: the 
successful completion of the customs union and the implementation of 




























































































devaluation of the French franc in August 1969 and a revaluation of the 
Deutschmark in November 1969.
These realignments proved to be highly disruptive for the CAP (which 
had been based on the assumption of stable exchange rates) and even 
posed risks to the customs union. The system of “monetaiy compensa­
tion amounts”, installed to preserve the unity of agricultural prices 
throughout the EC, was a makeshift device and bound to lead to 
frictions in the future.
With de Gaulle off the stage, politicians aimed at two things: the 
widening of the EC by allowing the four countries that had applied for 
membership (UK, Ireland, Denmark and Norway) to join the EC (a 
move which had been vigorously opposed by de Gaulle); and the 
deepening of the EC by establishing EMU.
It is interesting to note that at the time, those objectives were not 
regarded as mutually exclusive.
The first conference of the heads of state and government of the EC 
countries (later named European Council) in The Hague in December 
1969 dealt with these issues. The communiqué of the conference point­
ed clearly to the political significance of these initiatives. It spoke of 
preparing the path for a united Europe and of confirming the leaders’ 
belief in the political objectives which gave the Community its purpose.
Following the conference, in early 1970 a special committee was set 
up to study the realization of EMU by stages. Significantly, the 
committee was chaired by a politician, the Prime Minister of Luxem­
bourg, Pierre Werner. Among its other six members, there were only 
two central bankers; the remaining members were senior government 
officials and a high ranking representative of the EC Commission. In its 
report, the Werner Committee proposed to create EMU with a single 
currency and a European central bank in three stages over 10 years. It 
also recommended a common decision-making institution for economic 
policy and far-reaching rules for the coordination of fiscal policies.
While adhering to their objective of creating EMU, some member 
states when faced with the recommendations of the Werner Committee, 
in particular in view of the implied loss of sovereignty which could 
extend substantially beyond the monetary sphere, felt somewhat 
uncomfortable. It was therefore not surprising that the resolution of the 
Council of Ministers of March 22,1971 was somewhat timid; it was long 
on general objectives and short on concrete measures. Nevertheless, by 
embarking on a move toward the creation of a monetary union when 
worldwide the trend was in the opposite direction, namely toward 
flexible exchange rates, underlined its political significance. Dealing 




























































































-  the narrowing of fluctuation margins between EC currencies, aiming 
at their eventual elimination;
-  a better coordination of short-term economic and of monetary 
policies;
-  the speeding up of the liberalization of capital movements which had 
largely stagnated since the early Sixties;
-  a request for a report on the establishment of a European Fund for 
Monetary Cooperation.
The Fund was eventually established in April 1973, however without 
real competences. The most significant outcome of the Werner Report 
was the agreement of the EC central banks in April 1971 to set up an 
arrangement for narrower fluctuation margins between EC currencies 
as of June 1971.
But other events intervened. Because of the pronounced weakness of 
the US-dollar and under heavy speculative pressure, the Deutschmark 
and the Dutch guilder started to float in May 1971, after efforts to 
agree on a common response to the crisis in international financial 
markets were unsuccessful. In August 1971, the gold convertibility of the 
US dollar was suspended, and the dollar floated freely against other 
currencies. The Smithsonian Agreement of December 1971 which 
attempted to restore the system of fixed exchange rates by realigning 
the major currencies (including a devaluation of the US-dollar by about 
10 percent) and by establishing wider fluctuation margins of 2.25 
percent (instead of 1 percent) in order to add more flexibility to the 
international exchange rate system, ultimately failed. In March 1973, the 
Bretton Woods system of stable but adjustable exchange rates collapsed 
and was replaced by world-wide floating.3
To avoid the floating of EC currencies against each other and in 
order to limit the impact of the wider margins agreement on intra-EC 
exchange rates, the European common margins arrangement (the 
“snake”) was established in April 1972. Originally, under the blue print 
of the Werner Plan, such an arrangement was seen as a first step to 
monetary union. Now, it was a device to hold the EC together by a 
common exchange rate system. Even in this, it was not very successful 
as over time all major EC currencies but the Deutschmark left the 
arrangement. One important reason for this development was the 
aftermath of the first oil price crisis in 1973. But more important than 
the oil crisis itself was the lack of political will on the part of the EC 
countries to formulate a common response to the oil crisis. The Werner 




























































































Thus, it was not only that there was no progress in monetary inte­
gration which in turn could lead to more political integration but the 
lack of political cooperation even undermined economic objectives and 
achievements.
5.
The Seventies were a time of stagnation and unhappiness in the EC. 
Initiatives on a political level for closer cooperation in the field of 
exchange rate and monetary policies (Fourcade and Duisenberg 
proposals) and the idea of a European parallel currency proposed by a 
number of academics (All Saints’ Day Manifesto and OPTICA Re­
ports4) did not find acceptance. It was with a speech at the European 
University Institute in October 1977 that EC Commission President Roy 
Jenkins tried to jumpstart the process of European integration by 
reviving the idea of EMU.5 There was no immediate positive response 
but it is known that some leading politicians discussed matters infor­
mally with Jenkins.
In 1978, the German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and the French 
President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing took the initiative for the creation 
of the European Monetary System (EMS) which came into being in 
March 1979. While this initiative was much less ambitious than the 
Werner Plan, it had a clear political motivation: to shield the EC from 
monetary disturbances, originating mainly from the US-dollar, and to 
give a new impetus to integration.6 It is interesting to note that in 
launching the EMS, the regular EC channels and bodies, such as the 
Monetary Committee, were bypassed. In the end, the EMS was not 
created by a decision of the Council of Ministers but, on the basis of 
the resolution of the European Council of December 5, 1978, by an 
agreement of the EC central banks. The relevant texts concentrate very 
much on monetary and exchange rate policies, and there is no explicit 
mention of the EMS being a step toward EMU. In the conclusions of 
the presidency of the European Council meeting in Brussels in 
December 1978, it is only mentioned that “[the EMS will] give fresh 
impetus to the progress of European union”.7 Obviously, while 
politically motivated, one did not want to overreach as in the case of 
the Werner Plan.8
Any evaluation of EMS has to be conducted in monetary policy and 
operational terms.9 But is also clear that the consolidation of the EMS 
in 1982/83 was based on the political determination of a core of EC 




























































































exchange rate and balance payments problems were overcome by a 
combination of comprehensive realignments with domestic stabilization 
programs, particularly in France.10 The continued existence and the 
success of the EMS were considered essential for the EC as a whole as 
well as for its individual member countries. The emerging consensus on 
stability-oriented monetary and economic policies among a number of 
EC countries allowed the EMS to become the rallying point for 
intensified integration efforts, and its achievements provided the basis 
for the single market program, as incorporated in the Single European 
Act of 1986.
In a later phase, the EMS displayed again a political dimension, 
although less solidly based on economic realities. From January 1987 on, 
there was no general realignment in the EMS for more than 5 A years. 
This reflected in large part the degree of economic convergence which 
had been achieved by nearly all EC countries which participated in the 
exchange rate mechanism of the EMS (ERM) from the beginning. At 
the same time, the EMS was increasingly seen as a forerunner to EMU. 
There was a tendency, in anticipation of EMU and far ahead of reality, 
to regard exchange rates as more or less permanently fixed and to 
expect that this could be sustained by convergence efforts which would 
result from the need to prepare and qualify for participation in EMU. 
This image of the EMS as a quasi-monetary union was shattered by the 
events of late summer and autumn of 1992, in particular in September. 
The unexpected difficulties experienced in the referenda on the 
Maastricht Treaty in Denmark in June and perhaps even more in 
France in September 1992 put into question the notion of nearly 
automatic progress in convergence and toward EMU and brought to 
light that a number of ERM countries -  those who had joined the ERM 
more recently (Spain, UK, Portugal) and/or made use of the wider 
fluctuation margins of 6 percent (in the case of Italy until January 1990) 
-  lived on “borrowed stability”, based on large interest rate differentials 
and overly optimistic market expectations. As a result of the crisis, the 
pound sterling and the Italian lira left the ERM and the Spanish peseta 
and the Portuguese escudo had to be devalued. The disturbances also 
extended to some non-EC countries. Ironically, Finland, Norway and 
Sweden who had hoped to strengthen their ties with the EC by linking 





























































































In early 1988, a big debate started about asymmetry in the design and 
the operation of the EMS. This debate was only on the surface about 
technical issues such as intervention practices, financing of intramarginal 
intervention or interest rate developments. In examining those problems, 
economists had a field day.11 In economic terms, the key issue was the 
relative roles of financing and adjustment in balancing an exchange rate 
system. Politically, it was by no small measure also a debate about two 
closely related issues: the role of the Deutsche Bundesbank in 
European monetary policies, or -  to put in more abstract terms -  the 
function of an anchor currency in an exchange rate system; and more 
generally, the role of central banks in economic policies, i.e., the 
independence of central banks.
This debate was conducted on a political level by politicians such as 
the (then) Finance Ministers of France and Italy, Balladur and Amato, 
and the (then) German Foreign Minister Genscher and Finance 
Minister Stoltenberg. It brought the political aspects of monetary and 
exchange rate management into the center. Insofar, it was a conspicuous 
precursor to important issues which later on were intensely discussed in 
connection with the Delors Report and during the Intergovernmental 
Conference on EMU which began in December 1990.
In addition, the single market program gave rise to two interrelated 
questions. Was the single market feasible without a common monetary 
policy and a common currency? Was a single currency needed for the 
optimal realization of a single market?
In June 1988, at its meeting in Hannover, the European Council 
charged a special committee to study ways to establish EMU. It was 
chaired by Jacques Delors, President of the EC Commission, and in 
addition consisted of the governors and presidents of the central banks 
of the twelve EC countries, one other member of the EC Commission 
and three independent experts. The decision to have top central 
bankers form the core of the committee was significant and in large 
determined not only the results of the committee’s work but also the 
future discussions and negotiations about the nature of the intended 
monetary union.
The Delors Report was published in April 1989. It is of interest to 
note that the Delors Committee -  in contrast to the Werner Committee 
-  did not recommend the setting up of a common decision-making 
institution for economic policy, assigning this task mainly to the Council 
of Ministers, i.e. the representatives of the member states. In the same 




























































































fell noticeably short of the recommendations of the Werner Committee. 
While the Werner Report did not discuss in any detail institutional 
aspects of the proposed European central bank, the Delors Committee 
made the independence of such a central bank one of its major 
recommendations. Its proposals for the institutional setup of the bank 
were closely modelled after the Deutsche Bundesbank -  an aspect of 
economic as well as political importance.
In June 1989, the European Council accepted the Delors Report as 
basis for further work on EMU and agreed that the first stage toward 
the realization of EMU would begin on July 1,1990, coinciding with the 
deadline for the liberalization of capital movements for most EC 
countries, a cornerstone of the single market program. In early 1990, 
Chancellor Kohl and President Mitterand called for the formation of a 
political union, however without giving a clear indication of the meaning 
of this term. It was decided that intergovernmental conferences on 
EMU and political union would start in December 1990.
7.
Instead of dealing in detail with the discussions surrounding the Delors 
Report, this paper will consider a few problems which were widely and 
intensely discussed, in particular by the Intergovernmental Conference, 
and which are of special interest when we explore political aspects 
of EMU.
The first problem is that of the independence of a European Central 
Bank (ECB). In the EC, there are widely differing arrangements for the 
relations between the political authorities and the central bank. They 
range from situations where the government is in charge of monetary 
policy decisions and where the central bank is not much more than a 
department of the treasury, with the task of implementing government 
decisions, to a situation where the central bank formulates and 
implements monetary policy without direct interference from the 
political authorities.
The reasons are not simply that one country may be more fearful of 
inflation than others (although experience shows that countries with 
highly independent central banks are less prone to inflation). Also, it 
does not necessarily mean that there is a stronger belief in an effective 
trade-off between inflation and unemployment in one country than in 
another. The reasons go deeper. Obviously, there is a desire on part of 
politicians to yield as much power as possible in the economic field. In 




























































































opments according to their political beliefs. Behind this stands the more 
general concept that all aspects of economic policy, including monetary 
policy, should be subject to a unified approach. It was the government 
-  so goes the argument -  which through parliament was answerable to 
the electorate. Therefore, the principle of democratic accountability 
called for monetary policy powers to be in the hand of politicians.
Another view sees great risks emanating from the short-term policy 
interests and instincts of politicians for a consistent monetary policy 
oriented towards the longer-term needs of a country. It is believed that 
price stability is a precondition for longer-term stability and growth. 
Indeed, more recent economic theory and empirical research rejects the 
notion of a trade-off between inflation and unemployment except in the 
short-term. Inflation-free money -  or non-political money -  is consid­
ered an essential prerequisite for a functioning market economy. Price 
stability is thus seen as a quasi-constitutional element of a free 
economic order, together with market economy principles, private 
property and free competition. It is argued that only an independent 
central bank could ensure price stability. Democratic accountability was 
provided by a clear legal mandate for the central bank, appropriate 
appointment procedures for central bank leaders, and the requirement 
to justify policy to the public. It is interesting to note that independent 
central banks exist in such countries with well-established democratic 
traditions as USA, the Netherlands and Switzerland; and that there is 
or was no country with an authoritarian rule which had an independent 
central bank.
The Maastricht Treaty unequivocally provides for an independent 
central bank and for price stability as the primary objective of monetary 
policy (Art.107 and 105,1 respectively). It also requires that national 
central banks be granted independence prior to the transition to EMU 
(Art. 108).
8.
Related to the issue of functional or instrumental independence of a 
central bank is the question who should be in charge of exchange rate 
policy -  the central bank or the political authorities. There is the view 
and actual experience that monetary policy can be eroded from the 
external side, and that therefore the central bank should be fully in 
charge of exchange rate policy. Another view sees the exchange rate as 




























































































in particular investment, growth and employment. Therefore, responsi­
bility for exchange rate policy should rest with the political authorities.
The negotiations at the Intergovernmental Conference on this issue 
were not easy. The outcome was that the ECB will be in charge of all 
exchange transactions (Art. 105,2). That implies that in a world of 
floating currencies, the ECB is de facto in charge of exchange rate 
policy. The Council of Ministers may, however, acting by a qualified 
majority, formulate “general orientations”. Such general orientations 
“shall be without prejudice to the primary objective of the ESCB to 
maintain price stability” (Art.109,2). Furthermore, when it comes to 
possible agreements for an exchange rate system with non-community 
countries, consistency with the objective of price stability remains an 
important consideration. Decisions by the Council in this respect must 
be unanimous; for the setting of parities in any such system, a qualified 
majority is required (Art.109,1).
A third subject of great interest is the field of budgetary policies. It 
is here where the question could be asked whether monetary union will 
be viable in the longer term without a political authority determining in 
a community framework fiscal policies of member countries. Such power 
would constitute an important element of a political union.
Experience shows that a stability-oriented monetary policy cannot be 
successful in the longer run if not supported by appropriate budgetary 
policies. The turmoil in international financial markets in September 
1992 was in part related to the problem of compatibility between 
monetary and fiscal policies within as well as between a number of 
countries such as the USA, Germany, Italy and the UK.
For the Werner Committee of 1970, the challenge and the answer 
were clear. Common decisions were to be taken on the size of deficits 
and their financing as well as with regard to the main elements of 
budgets such as revenue and expenditure and the distribution of the 
latter between investment and consumption. In 1990, such a far-reaching 
solution was considered as neither politically acceptable nor as 
economically necessary.
While the Delors Report did not go as far as the Werner Report, it 
called for binding rules on budget deficits and their financing. This 
raised the question of national sovereignty. Budget authority is one of 
the main prerogatives of any parliament. Limiting this prerogative is 
tantamount to reducing national sovereignty.
The Maastricht Treaty does not mandate binding rules for fiscal 





























































































-  no bail-out (Art.l04b);
-  no central bank financing of budget deficits (Art.104,1);
-  the avoidance of excessive budget deficits, as defined by quantitative 
criteria, relating to the size of government deficit and debt 
(Art. 104c, 1 and 2);
-  the possible application of gradually more severe sanctions 
(Art.l04c,ll).
To many, it was obvious that market forces are not enough to enforce 
discipline in fiscal matters, although they may exert some pressure; 
therefore the need for rules. However, given the political interplay 
between government, parliament, pressure groups and the public at 
large, fiscal policy cannot be separated from other policies such as social 
policy, industrial policy, subsidies for various purposes or from social 
developments in general. Therefore, one can have legitimate doubts 
whether the rules of the Maastricht Treaty will be sufficient to ensure 
responsible fiscal behavior or to prevent policy paralysis due to 
protracted discussions and tensions over national fiscal policies.
At the opposite ends of a wide range of views on the relationship 
between fiscal policies and political union, one could formulate two 
answers:
-  To all those who see a link between EMU and political union, a 
common monetary policy requires and eventually leads to common 
decision-making on budget matters.
-  In the other view, any move toward political union and hence to the 
surrender of national sovereignty in fiscal matters is not wanted; 
therefore a full-fledged monetary union, because it requires some 
binding coordination of fiscal policies, is not possible or desirable 
either.
10.
Another area where economic and political considerations will have to 
be brought into balance, is the role of the European Council and the 
Council of Ministers in the decision-making process in EMU. The 
French government put particular emphasis on what it called “gouver­
nement économique”.12 This would allow a parallelism, a dialogue 
between the “pôle monétaire” represented by the ECB -  and a “pôle 
économique”. The independence of the ECB could only be understood 




























































































latter, the French did, however, not have in mind a central decision­
making institution for economic policy but rather a strong involvement 
of the European Council and the Council of Ministers in decisions 
concerning EMU.
This idea was again apparent in an interview President Mitterand 
gave before the French referendum of September 20, 1992.13 He said: 
“[La future Banque Centrale] ne décide pas la politique économique 
[dont la politique monétaire sera l’application]. C’est le Conseil 
Européen, ce sont les douze Chefs d’Etat et de Gouvernement, c’est-à- 
dire les politiques élus au suffrage universel qui décideront.” However, 
this interpretation of the Maastricht Treaty is not consistent with its 
actual provisions, and reflects more the French position at the start of 
the negotiations than the eventual outcome.
The French proposal for an EMU treaty14 envisaged that the Euro­
pean Council, on the basis of reports of the Council of Ministers, would 
define broad orientations for EMU and for the economic policy of the 
Community. Within such orientations, the Council of Ministers would 
coordinate the policies of member states and make recommendations 
to individual governments.
These ideas, although somewhat weakened, are reflected in the 
Maastricht Treaty. The Council of Ministers shall draft broad guidelines 
for the economic policies of member states, to be discussed by the 
European Council. On this basis, the Council of Ministers adopts, with 
qualified majority, a “recommendation” setting out these broad 
guidelines (Art.103,2).
With regard to exchange rate policy, the French proposal envisaged 
that the Council of Ministers would define the orientations of exchange 
rate policy. The Maastricht Treaty says that the Council of Ministers 
may formulate “general orientations” which, however, shall be without 
prejudice to the primary objective of monetary policy to maintain price 
stability.
On monetary policy, the French treaty proposal provided for the 
possibility that the Council of Ministers could submit motions for 
discussion by the Governing Council of the European System of Central 
Banks (ESCB). This idea did not become part of the treaty.
11.
The last area of interest I want to discuss are the provisions for the 
transition to the final stage of EMU. Here, the European Council will 




























































































the Council of Ministers, it will be up to the European Council to de­
cide when the final stage should begin, somewhere between January 1, 
1997 and January 1,1999, and which countries would qualify for partici­
pation. The treaty contains a number of qualification criteria with 
regard to price stability, public finances, interest rate levels and 
exchange rate sustainability. But in application of these criteria, a 
certain degree of discretion is allowed, and other aspects of economic 
performance, such as the balance of payments and unit labor costs, are 
to be taken into account (Art.l09j,l and 2).
It is this element of discretion that triggered a lot of criticism. Would 
the Council not be tempted for political reasons to dilute the economic 
criteria for participation and thus endanger the viability of EMU from 
the start? Would there not be the danger of compromises and even of 
horse-trading? Would certain general policy objectives, such as avoiding 
a multi-tiered Community, be not in conflict with sound economic 
principles?
All such questions can finally be answered only in the future. 
However, one would expect or hope that the politicians in charge at 
that time would realize that establishing EMU is a serious undertaking 
which in the longer run will determine the future of the Community and 
should not be seen from a short-term perspective of political conve­
nience. Otherwise, the whole enterprise of EMU and the hope for 
further progress in economic and political integration would be at risk.
12.
Until now, I mainly commented on the political implications and 
consequences of certain economic aspects of European monetary 
integration. Let me add a few comments on the relationship between 
the concepts of EMU and political union. The concept of EMU has 
been much more clearly defined than the concept of political union. 
Already the Werner Report presented a precise definition of EMU.
As already mentioned, Chancellor Kohl and President Mitterand 
established a link between EMU and political union in early 1990. It 
was in particular Kohl who felt, in connection with German unification, 
that -  as a corollary to the creation of EMU and the future abandon­
ment of the Deutschmark -  Germany should be more firmly anchored 
in Europe not only in economic but also in political terms. He was in 
particular concerned about a more democratic rule for the Community 
and therefore in favor of more power for the European Parliament. 




























































































does not envisage a political union in the sense of central institutions 
and majority voting with regard to political issues. The treaty mainly 
provides for intensified cooperation between member states in such 
areas as foreign and defense policies. Also, the European Parliament 
will only gain a limited extension of its responsibilities. In the Maastricht 
Treaty, the concept of national sovereignty has not been given up in 
favor of community responsibility.
Whether with regard to the question of national sovereignty versus 
community responsibility, the treaty went far enough or too far, the 
debate in various EC countries led to different conclusions. One view 
strongly rejects any community role in matters of foreign, defense and 
social policies. There is even strong resistance to the concept of EMU. 
In this category seem to fall countries like Denmark and the United 
Kingdom.
Another view shows strong attachment to national sovereignty in such 
“classical” areas as foreign and defense policies. However, EMU is 
strongly favored, in part because it is hoped to compensate for a loss in 
national autonomy in the monetary field by shared responsibility. France 
is an example.
A third view, mainly found in Germany, all along seriously doubted 
the feasibility of a single currency unless supported by strict economic 
rules and built on a foundation of closer political union. Similar views 
seem to be held in the Netherlands and in Luxembourg.
In some countries, however, EMU is considered not only a worthy 
objective in itself but also as an important step toward political union. 
A political union is seen as providing some protection against a possible 
hegemony of any of the larger countries or a coalition of larger 
countries. One could mention in this category countries like Italy, 
Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands.
13.
In order to sum up, it can be observed that from the very beginning, 
after World War II, the economic and monetary integration of Europe 
had a strong political motivation. Integration in the economic field was 
not only seen as a way to overcome the destruction of the war and to 
improve the standard of living for the people of Europe but also as a 
means to leave behind century-old rivalries and to eliminate the risk of 
wars in Europe.
Political objectives time and again helped to overcome difficulties in 




























































































But it must also be noted that there was a strong adherence to concepts 
of national sovereignty and to nationally defined, often short-term 
economic interests. This undermined until now attempts in the EC to 
create an economic and monetary union that would combine the insti­
tutional elements of a common monetary order and a high degree of 
economic policy interaction and convergence, which is widely considered 
an indispensable precondition for any monetary union. There was even 
more difficulty to agree on meaningful elements of a political union 
which in the view of many would have to provide a solid foundation for 
EMU and which would justify the substitution of national currencies -  
powerful symbols of sovereignty and independence, and in some 
countries such as Germany also of political, economic and social 
achievements after a disastrous war -  by an untested single European 
currency. These are the questions which are at the heart of the debate 
about the Maastricht Treaty. The answers will decide the fate of the 
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